Why secret ballot

Political scientists are concerned about ever-diminishing voter turnout and unequal voter participation. In response to low turnout at the polls, several countries have introduced a plethora of policies aimed at making the voting process more convenient—such as postal voting, on-demand absentee balloting, early voting in person, and internet voting.

In the United States, about one quarter of all voters opted to cast their votes by mail in the presidential election. In other words, voting by mail does not make more people vote, nor does it really increase the participation of minorities. Second, and arguably more importantly, the security of the ballot is not guaranteed if voting takes place at home.

The coauthors—a husband-and-wife team—argue that some of these convenience measures undermine the very ballot secrecy that was originally introduced to prevent intimidation and bribery of voters—practices which have started to reemerge. Experts agree that increasing voter participation is vital to restoring faith in the democratic processes. Imagine, for example, that an employer offers to witness your ballot and to mail it for you.

Or a landlord sends someone to collect your rent along with your ballot and requests that the envelope remain open. What of immigrants with limited language abilities who encounter a party operative who offers to help in completing the ballot? The possibilities for abuse and undue influence are myriad if secret voting cannot be ensured, Orr says. Given the COVID pandemic, voting by mail this November would allow tens of millions of people to participate safely.

Yet there are risks to the integrity of the voting. The latter describes efforts by relatively wealthy, powerful, or well-placed people to interfere—more or less directly—with the voting choices of those who are less influential. Susan Orr: It was originally introduced as a reform in the late 19th century to address persistent and widespread electoral domination. In practice the distinction between the first two categories is not always obvious.

Observation is not confined to the actual polling day but includes ascertaining whether any irregularities have occurred in advance of the elections, during the elections, or after polling especially during the vote counting and announcement of the results.

The institution of an observer is prescribed by some constitutional provisions. Whereas the Constitution of Zambia provides that the Electoral Commission shall accredit observers and election agents, as prescribed Art. It is worth noting that the Council of Europe puts an emphasis on the issue of independent observation of elections as an effective mechanism of monitoring, which eliminates the risk of irregularities. It is pointed out that such monitoring should refer to both the course of voting and the phase directly following voting—counting the votes.

At the same time it is emphasized that the efficiency of observing the course of voting depends on two basic circumstances: covering with monitoring as many electoral procedures as possible, as well as the pluralization of election observers, as they should represent as many points of view as possible; in particular, their number should include opposition representatives.

They may include information concerning the election to which they relate. Sometimes, for instance in Australia, in the case of entering any notes on ballot papers that would enable identifying a voter, the ballot shall be deemed void Art.

Such a regulation meets its strictly stated tasks included in international documents that specify the issue of democratic elections. For instance, in Germany the violation of secrecy of the ballot Verletzung des Wahlgeheimnisses is penalized in section c of the Criminal Code Ger.

The person committing this crime may do so only on purpose with direct intent. Generally, acts involving obtaining knowledge on how someone voted against the will of the voter, together with the violation of provisions regarding the secrecy of the ballot, are penalized. Generally, for creating an electoral committee and for the registration of candidates the signatures of a specified number of voters must be presented.

By giving such a support voters disclose their political preferences as it is quite obvious that a voter will vote for that list or that candidate.

For this purpose, exceptions from the rule of ballot secrecy are accepted. This question is recognized by the constitutional lawmakers in Malta, as Article 56 10 of the Constitution of Malta stipulates:. Provided that provision may be made by law whereby, if a person is unable, by reason of blindness, other physical cause or illiteracy to mark on his ballot paper, his ballot paper may be marked on his behalf and on his directions by some other person officially supervising the poll at the place of voting.

Provided that where a person is by reason of blindness unable to mark on his ballot paper, provision may be made by law requiring that at the request of any such person adequate and special means are to be provided which will enable that person to mark on his ballot paper independently and without the need of assistance. There also can occur the issue of voting by a person who is not entitled to vote. The risk is eliminated by receiving a voting package in person, and then giving it back to an election committee.

The abovementioned doubts were considered by constitutional courts which differently referred to that question. The German Federal Constitutional Court stated that a voter who votes via correspondence is obliged to keep secrecy of voting.

They are used on a mass scale in countries like Belarus and Russia. Such ballot boxes are used in workplaces, as well as areas of low population density. There is also another problematic question—supporting ballot boxes used in separate electoral districts , that is, hospitals and social assistance houses. They are used because of another constitutional value, which is the right to vote in elections.

In a case where a voter declares their will to use a supporting ballot box, putting a ballot paper in requires in some cases that at least two members of the electoral committee be present. Additionally, these members must be appointed by two different election committees. On the one hand there is a view according to which the state and its authorities are obliged to ensure the secrecy of voting only within specified frames, from the moment a vote is sent from the device used to cast the vote computer, tablet, or smartphone.

The voter must be aware of the risk of losing their vote even before it is sent. On the other hand there is a view according to which the state and its authorities should ensure the secrecy of the ballot from the very beginning to the end of the whole procedure. Acceptance of the latter view highly complicates, or even makes impossible, the implementation of i-voting as the state and its authorities are not capable of ensuring full secrecy of the ballot.

The transfer of blank ballots to voters is reasonable and does not risk voters' privacy or election integrity; indeed, a key provision of the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment MOVE Act of was to require all states to allow voters to request and receive blank ballots via electronic means.

We recognize that in some situations, it is challenging to return a ballot via postal mail. It is important that all voters — including overseas and military voters — should have access to traditional absentee mail-in ballots. These ballots do not require a privacy waiver. Our concern lies with the transmission of marked ballots via the Internet. We need look no further than the warning all Alaska voters receive if they use the online voting system to cast their absentee ballots.

For some overseas and military voters Internet voting may seem more convenient, but until technology advances to a point where it can be done securely, the risks are overwhelming and it should not be an option. Nicholson was called on to form a government but was unable to, and Haines was recalled.

At this point, advocates of the secret ballot had little idea about how such a system could be implemented. The challenge was taken up by Henry Samuel Chapman, one of the legislature members, who had been a reform activist in Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Tasmania before arriving in Melbourne to practice law in Chapman devised a system where government printed ballot papers with the names of all nominees and distributed them through its election officials.

The voter would then delete the names of candidates he did not support. Reluctantly, Haines agreed to let the re-worded electoral Bill be brought before the legislature. It was passed and the new law took effect 19 March The election of the first Victorian parliament by this system was held between August and October Tasmania and South Australia were also debating the implementation of the secret ballot in In Tasmania, the ballot was included in the Electoral Act which took effect 24 September South Australia passed secret ballot legislation only a month after Victoria with New South Wales following suit in However, South Australia made a change to the voting mechanism whereby instead of deleting the names of unwanted candidates, voters marked an X beside the name of the candidates they wanted.

This is the system that went on to be implemented in Britain in and across the United States after the presidential elections of